The Continued Security Challenges at U.S. Embassies
By Wendy Innes | 01/17/2013 | Headline, In-Depth, Safety, War and Foreign Policy | 9 Comments
Credit: militaryphotos.net
In light of the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, Congress has requested an additional 1,000 Marine security guards be added to the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group in order to beef up security at America’s overseas diplomatic interests, but fulfilling this request could be easier said than done, and it may not be enough to thwart another attack.
The Marine Corps Embassy Security Group
There are currently about 1,200 Marines serving with the Embassy Security Group in 130 of the 180 countries in which the State Department has diplomatic interests. The congressional mandate would nearly double the size of the Embassy Security Group by the beginning of the 2014 fiscal year, which is when the authorization for the additional personnel begins. It would last for three years.
A Marine Corps spokesman at the Pentagon, Capt. Gregory Wolf, said in an interview with the Marine Corps Times that it shouldn’t be a problem to meet the new staffing requirements, but others aren’t so sure.
In the same article, Andrew Bufalo, the author of a book about the Embassy Security Group, “Ambassadors in Blue,” points to a number of challenges that the State Department and Marine Corps are going to have to overcome in order to meet the mandate. Bufalo previously served as a detachment commander with the group at embassies in the Republic of Congo and Australia.
According to Bufalo, the Marine Corps has always had challenges meeting staffing demands of the Embassy Security Group because the standards are so high. The Embassy Security Group requires higher quality Marines and, for this reason, many commanders are reluctant to let their best Marines go.
In addition, of those Marines selected to attend the group’s training, about 25 percent wash out of the program because they can’t meet the requirements.
This has led to Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST) being used to fill in gaps in security needs, but as Bufalo points out, the standards for this group are not as high as they are for Embassy Security Group, making it easier for more Marines to become part of these teams. He cautions against lowering standards simply to fill available positions, saying that operations could suffer.
The training for Embassy Security Group takes seven weeks and there are five classes per year. Each class starts with 200 students, but 150 or less will graduate. At that rate, it would take more than a year to fulfill the congressional mandate for 1,000 new guards, well past the beginning of the 2014 fiscal year.
In addition, Marines are limited to the amount of time they spend with the Embassy Security Group, which means that more Marines are leaving as the new guards arrive. Training 1,000 new Marines for embassy security could force the Corps to add more classes, but this presents another problem.
Training more Marines would facilitate the need for more instructors or larger classes with each Marine receiving less attention and scrutiny. Instructor positions are always hard to fill because they require experience and training, above and beyond the students they are teaching. Again, this means that operations could suffer.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security
The Marine Corps Embassy Security Group is responsible for the security of the State Department’s physical locations, though their duties often overlap with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the civilian force responsible for the security of information and the people working for the State Department. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has final authority.
The shortage of Marine security guards is not the only problem the State Department faces when it comes to the security of its interests.
In fact, the Government Accountability Office issued a report back in 2009 detailing multiple security shortcomings at the department’s various sites and recommended that the department conduct a review of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. As of November 2012, that review had not been done as recommended.
According to the GAO’s November 2012 report:
“Diplomatic Security faces several policy and operational challenges. First, State is maintaining missions in increasingly dangerous locations, necessitating the use of more security resources and making it more difficult to provide security in these locations. Second, although Diplomatic Security has grown considerably in staff, staffing shortages, as well as other operational challenges, further tax Diplomatic Security’s ability to implement its mission. Finally, State has expanded Diplomatic Security without the benefit of adequate strategic planning.”
While the Bureau of Diplomatic Security tried to take steps on its own to improve, they fell woefully short.
“We appreciate the steps that the Bureau has taken on its own initiative,” the GAO report said, “however we continue to believe that the Department, and not the Bureau, needs to take action in order to strategically assess the competing demands on Diplomatic Security and the resulting mission implications.”
Had the State Department done as the GAO recommended, it’s possible that adequate security would have been available in Benghazi and that the four Americans lost would still be alive.
While it’s admirable that Congress wants to increase security assets now, as well they should, it’s a little like closing the barn door after the horse is already out. The rush to solve continued security challenges at U.S. embassies and consulates could end up causing more harm than good if the right people aren’t adequately trained and equipped to do the job, and it isn’t part of an overall revamping of embassy security.
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9 Comments
Alex Gauthier
01.17.2013
@alexg
“At that rate, it would take more than a year to fulfill the congressional mandate for 1,000 new guards, well past the beginning of the 2014 fiscal year.” definitely a fact that many americans are quick to overlook. Perhaps not maintaining a presence in 180 foreign countries is the most effective way to ensure our diplomats’ safety
Wendy Innes
01.18.2013
@wendyppp
Well at least in the most hostile places where they are likely to encounter safety issues :) Send the diplomats in once it’s safe.
Michael Ernette
01.21.2013
@michael_ernette
Well spoken, Alex. I hate to agree with Bob Beckel, but one of the things he keeps saying is , “Why give the Taliban a date?” Just pack up and get out. We are not making friends in all these foreign countries by maintaining a presence. Its time to determine which “true allies” continue to require our assistance (and by the way, most of our real allies don’t need that much), and forsake the others. I know that sounds isolationist, but I’m tried of seeing good young men and women die in service to our country for countries that our simply using our troops to prevent their own children from facing fire. And yes, I’m talking about the ones that don’t like us anyway (read: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, etc)
Peter
01.19.2013
I think your facts are off, and you don’t know the first thing about Diplomatic Security and what it does. If you did, you might actually the answer to the problems it faces. I think the author should have kept her opinions to her self……or at least get the facts right before writing an article.
Wendy Innes
01.19.2013
@wendyppp
None of what was expressed in this article was my personal opinion about Diplomatic Security or the Marine security guards for that matter, but was taken from multiple credible sources. I’m sorry that you disagree with the assesment and recommendations of the GAO, perhaps you should direct your comments to them on how to solve their ongoing security problems.
Michael Ernette
01.21.2013
@michael_ernette
I read nothing in this article that specified the author’s opinion in the least. She quoted the problems presented from the standpoint of the United States Marine Corps, through its spokeman Captain Gregory Wolf (not necessarily the opinion of the author), former lead of an Embassy Security Detachment Group, Mr. Andrew Bufalo (not the opinion of the author), and the United States Government Accounting Office. Certainly Ms. Innes was not consulted in writing the 2009 report, so how is that possibly the author’s opinion, or just statement of fact.
Personally, I was an 8404 rated US Navy Hospital Corpsman who trained at Camp Lejuene, and am familiar with the procedures of the Corps and the United States Department of the Navy. As an analogy, I recall hearing complaints by government officials concerning the construction of the Sea Wolf and Virginia class fast attack submarines. The complain was that we had a full compliment of 688i class fast boats and the new products “weren’t necessary”. Fortunately, Congress had the foresight to realize that the fleet would age and the General Dynamics Electric Boat in Groton is not a turn key operation that can produce a vessel in a matter of months.
The same holds true for security detachments. It takes time to train Marines, especially good Marines for speciality details. Further, BUPERS has to endorse specified Marines to billets for their “C” school training, which almost ALWAYS takes place at the end of another tour, because as the writer points out, Grade A Marines are seldom permitted to leave their own CO’s charge.
This is not opinion, its a matter of fact that Benghazi could have been prevented by taking the actions promoted by the GAO. Neither the State Department nor the Department of the Navy showed the initiative that we saw in Naval Vessel retention and replacement. And it is unfortunate, because people died. In my opinion, I believe the writer is highlighting the fact that these things should not happen again. It is not blame, it is learning from mistakes that we should be drawing from this piece.
A. Patriot
01.24.2013
The Marine Security Guards (MSGs) do not have a mission that overlaps with the Diplomatic Security Service. and the Marine Security Grup and their MSGs are NOT responsible for physical security of State Department Facilities. The Diplomatic Security Service is solely responsible for the protection of life, information and facilities abroad (for the Department). Upon request of DSS, MSGs fill a support role for DSS at designated Embassies and Consulates that process significant sensitive information. They primarily protec classified info for DSS. The MSGs at an Embassy or Consulate are under the operational command of the senior DSS agent at the site. That DSS agent holds the diplomatic title of Regional Security Officer (RSO). The MSGs are a great progam but they are not the answer to incidents like Ben Ghazi. During an attack, MSGs may typically defend a designated building, but not the entire compound (like the ten-acre facility in Ben Ghazi). Furthermore, they would do so under the operational command of the RSO (Senior DSS agent). What would have made a difference in Ben Ghazi was an armed professional guard force on the perimeter and several more highly trained DSS agents to engage anyone who got past the guards. There was no classified info in Ben Ghazi, so no MSGs. 1000 more MSGs won’t fix this. 1000 more DSS agents would have helped a lot!
Wendy Innes
01.25.2013
@wendyppp
Thank you for your thoughtful comment. :)
What was presented was a highly simplified version of how security works. It’s a fact that in every facet of the government and the military, jobs overlap. Missions changed constantly. I’ve seen it many times in the last dozen years I’ve spent with the military. There are also other military members and even third country nationals who work at the embassies and consulates, but the goal of this peice was not to write a detailed job description for everyone who works at the embassy. If the focus is on the two sentences that describe what thousands of people do, we are missing the forest for the trees.
No one is blaming anything that has happened at the embassy in Benghazi on any of the people on the ground, especially the Marines, who as you so rightly pointed out were not there. Benghazi was a small outpost, and perhaps it made a more appealing target to terrorists because it wasn’t as heavily guarded as other locations. This article simply detailed some of the many challenges that are faced in securing these locations in the future.
The question posed here is “Would more guards have helped?” Clearly the answer is yes. Would it matter what form they came in? Perhaps not, because at the end of the day a highly trained person with bullets and body armor can be effective when the situation goes sideways. It’s possible that creating 1,000 more MSGs is seen as being more cost effecting than creating 1.000 more DSS agents, since military pay is so much lower than what the civilian government employees are paid, which is signifcantly lower still than what security contractors are paid. Again these are things that everyone should be asking of the State Department and Congress, because for as much value as we place on classified information and buildings, the real value at such sites is the people who work there, and sadly it took losing 4 of them before anyone paid attention to a problem that the State Department had been aware of for at least 2 years.
A. Patriot
01.25.2013
Wendy, I think you are still missing the point. By long standing agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) between the USMC and DoS, it is not the role of the Marines, nor should it be, to fight on Embassy grounds. To change that you would have to change an agreement and arrangement that has passed the test of time. What I was trying to clarify when I said that Marines mission doesn’t overlap but is subordinate to DSS is that more DSS agents would provide far broader benefit to the Department because of the many things they can do. They manage the Marine Security Guard program and lead them. But they serve as regional security advisors to the Ambassador, they provide a counter intelligence capability, an anti-terrorism function, guard force management, investigations related fraud, suitability, threats and other special investigations, protective operations (off compound where Marines will not go) and on and on. Do DSS special agents cost more? Hell yes. But it is because they do all of the things I just described. If you truly wanted to enlighten the public about the correct response to the future of embassy/consulate security, you would be telling people to hire more DSS agents – the experts who run security in the full broad spectrum of security programs for the Foreign Service. It is a mission that the Marines do not have and do not want. They are elite war fighters. I know. I used to be one. Question 1: The Marines will not serve at posts like Ben Ghazi by agreement (and don’t want to) so how would more Marines help? The is the fundamental question. In my view, the proper discussion has still not taken place and may never. By the way, implementation of the GAO recommendations would in no way have guaranteed that Ben Ghazi would have been different. I am very familiar with the GAO report. It discussed strategic planning and more language training for agents. The problem in Ben Ghazi was 1) too few agents on the ground – a team of specially trained agents (a Security Support Team incorrectly referred to as a Site Security Team) were recalled to Virginia too soon, and 2) no professional armed guard force – because the host country said no. Question 2: Please tell me how the GAO recommendations would have changed that? Finally, the US Ambassador in any country has the final say regarding security and activities in a country. Ambassador Stevens knew the risks and documented them but chose to go. Even the senior DSS agent was not empowered to overrule him. I commend his courage but he knew the risks and went anyway. But that’s the way it works.